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IN THE STTPREMF rOTTRT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IN T E E MOD N T A I N
ASSOCIATION OF C R E D I T
MEN, a I Jtah Corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant
vs.

' \ - ••
1
J
f f
\ Case No.
'

T H E V I L L A G E R , INC., 11
Delaware Corporation and
V I L L A G E R I N D U S T R I E S IN C
A Corporation,
Defendants-Respondents,

13377

|
I
I
f

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ST i \ T E M E N T O F K I N D O F C A S E
Plaintiff, as assignee f< r (Jn* benefit of creditors of
The Company Enterprises, I.K. (hereafter The Company) sought to have defendants' purported inventory
security interests declared ni ill and void
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DISPOSITION IN L O W E R COURT
Upon stipulated facts and reciprocal motions for
summary judgment, the trial court held that on the date
of the assignment to plaintiff, the defendants held valid
security interests in The Company's merchandise at
two of its four retail outlets.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks to reverse that portion of the judgment of the trial court which declared that defendants
held valid security interests in The Company's merchandise inventory at its retail outlets at 2354 Washington Boulevard, Ogden, Utah and 22 East First
South, Salt Lake City, Utah.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The case was submitted to the trial court on stipulated facts. The essential facts are set forth in the
written stipulation filed below, dated October 6, 1972
(R. 57). The written stipulation was supplemented by
an oral stipulation made at the hearing below on April
16, 1973, which is incorporated in Paragraph 2 of the
Court's Findings. (R. 7)
On the 3rd day of September, 1971, The Company
made a voluntary assignment for the benefit of creditors
to the plaintiff, Inter Mountain Association of Credit
Men (hereafter "Association"). (R. 63) That at the
time of the assignment, The Company conducted busi2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ness and maintained a stock of merchandise at four
retail stores located at 22 East First South, Salt Lake
City, Utah; 2354 Washington Boulevard, Ogden, Utah;
1362 Foothill Boulevard, Salt Lake City, Utah; and
224 South 13th East, Salt Lake City, Utah. I n addition,
The Company maintained a warehouse at 353 Pierpont
Avenue, Salt Lake City, Utah.
Pursuant to the assignment, the Association liquidated the personal property at each of the addresses
above indicated, including the merchandise inventory
on hand at the four retail stores. All sales by the Association were in bulk and all were for cash with the exception of the sale of the personal property located at
22 East First South, Salt Lake City, Utah. A t the
store last mentioned, the total sales price of all personal
property, including the merchandise inventory, was
$58,688.33 (R. 89) of which plaintiff received the sum
of $30,000.00 in cash and a promissory note for the balance in the amount of $28,688.33. The full balance is
still unpaid under the terms of said promissory notes.
From the other three retail stores, the plaintiff received
the following amounts, to wit:
AMOUNT
BEC

ADDRESS
1362 Foothill Boulevard,
Salt Lake City, Utah
224 South 13th East,
Salt Lake City, Utah
2354 Washington Boulevard,
Ogden, Utah

sII,E D Or R O M

INVENTORY
$36,202.57 (R. 88)
23,053.49 (R. 92)
6,954.20 (R. 91)

3
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The defendants (hereafter Villager) 1 claim a security interest in the proceeds of the sale of the inventory pursuant to the assignment for the benefit of
creditors. Villager claims that at the time of the assignment for the benefit of credtiors, it held valid security interests on the inventory of The Company located at
all four retail outlets. Villager's claim stems from two
security agreements dated November 29, 1968 (R. 65),
and March 29,1968 (R. 71) whereunder the defendant,
The Villager, Inc. is the secured party and "the villarge brownstone, ltd.", is the debtor. Both security
agreements contain the following identical provisions
contained in Paragraph 2 of each instrument, to wit:
"2. To secure the indebtedness set forth above,
the Undersigned hereby grants to Villager a security interest in and to all of the Undersigned's
present and future accounts, contract rights, general intangibles, instruments, documents, chattel
paper, and a purchase money security interest in
the inventory wherever located, and the proceeds
and products thereof (all hereinafter called 'Collateral'), together with all other items of Collateral of the same class or classes acquired by the
Undersigned after the execution of this agreement and prior to its termination." (Emphasis
supplied)
Notice of the security interest claimed was
accordance with Section 70A-9-401 (1) (b)
a financing statement with the Secretary of
the 14th day of April, 1969 (R. 70) and the

given in
by filing
State on
19th day

iFor purposes of this case, defendants are treated as one—
Village Industries being the assignee or partial assignee of The
Villager, Inc.
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of March, 1968 (R. 76) respectively. All of the inventory on hand at the four retail locations of The
Company at the time of the assignment was purchased
by The Company from suppliers other than the Villager. (R. 60) At the time of the execution of the two
security agreements, however, Villager was the sole suppliers of the merchandise inventory to the Village
Brownstone, Ltd. at its two retail outlets at 22 East
First South, Salt Lake City, Utah and 2354 Washington Blvd., Ogden, Utah. (R. 60)
On the 30th day of July, 1970, The Village
Brownstone, Ltd. merged with The Company Enterprises; Village Ltd.; and Village Brownstone Enterprises. The Company Enterprises was the survivor of
the merger and it continued to do business at the two
addresses theretofore operated by The Village Brownstone, Ltd. and in addition thereto maintained retail
stores at 1362 Foothill Blvd. and 224 South 13th East,
Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 59) The Company conducted business at the retail store outlets previously
occupied by The Village Brownstone, Ltd. under the
assumed name of "Village Brownstone". (R. 58)
Prior to the merger, Villager supplied merchandise
to the Village Brownstone Enterprises, doing business
at the Biltmore Plaza, Phoenix, Arizona (R. 61) On
November 1, 1968, Villager obtained a security agreement from The Village Brownstone Enterprises which
unlike that of The Village Brownstone, Ltd., did not
restrict the interest of Villager to a purchase money
5
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security interest in inventory* Paragraph 2 thereof provided:
"2. To secure the indebtedness set forth above,
the Undersigned hereby grants to Villager a security interest in and to all of the Undersigned s
present and future accounts, contract rights, general intangibles, instruments, documents, chattel
paper, equipment (including, but not limited to,
machinery, furniture, furnishings and fixtures),
•ami t^iijuiiilwywhftpciu iututufl; and Ibt piuuuudj
and inventory wherever located. . . . "
Villager filed a financing statement on April 21, 1969
with the Secretary of State's office of the State of Arizona. No financing statement was filed with the Utah
Secretary of State relating to the security agreement
with The Village Brownstone Enterprises. (R. 61)
Following the merger Villager continued to
supply merchandise to the prior retail outlets of
The Village Brownstone, Ltd., in Utah and The Village Brownstone Enterprises in Arizona, although
none of this merchandise was on hand at the time of
the assignment for the benefit of the creditors. The
total amount unpaid due defendants as of the date of
the assignment on September 3, 1971, was the sum
of $55,249.07 of which $38,381.87 represented the
balance for merchandise shipped and sold to the outlets
in Utah and $16,867.20 represented the balance for
merchandise shipped and sold to the outlets in Arizona.
(R. 61)
None of the merchandise inventory in the State
of Arizona was included or made a part of the assign6
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ment for the benefit of creditors on September 3, 1971.
(R. 62)
On September 3, 1971, at the time of the assignment for the benefit of creditors, no part of the inventory or merchandise owned by The Village Brownstone, Ltd. at the time of the security agreements referred to or owned by The Village Brownstone, Ltd.
at the time of the merger on July 30, 1970 was in existence. (R. 60)

ARGUMENT
Fixtures, as well as inventory, were liquidated by
the Association. Villager concedes, however, and the
trial court so determined, that its claim is limited solely
to the proceeds of the inventory inasmuch as fixtures
and equipment were not covered by any of its security
agreements relied upon. The question then is whether
Villager is entitled to the proceeds from the sale of the
inventory or any part thereof. Upon analysis, this is in
reality a three-fold question:
(1). Can Villager claim a security interest in inventory acquired after the date of the security agreements ?
(2). If so, will Villager's security interests extend
to such after-acquired inventory on hand at the date
of the assignment for the benefit of creditors, when
all of such inventory was acquired after the merger
by The Company as survivor of the merger and not by

7
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The Village Brownstone, Ltd., the debtor under the
security agreement (R. 60); and
(3). where none of such after-acquired inventory
was purchased from Villager, although Villager is
restricted by its own agreements to a "purchase money
security interest?"
The Association concedes that security interests in property to be acquired in the future were
specifically recognized in Utah even before the enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code. Mcintosh v. United States, 21 U. 2d, 12, 439 P.2d 464
(1968). The applicable code provision is found at
70A-9-204 (3) U.C.A. 1953, as amended. Accordingly,
as a general proposition, Villager is entitled to assert
a security interest in after-acquired property; but it is
the Association's position that the after-acquired property clause of Villager's several security agreements
does not extend to the inventory liquidated by the Association under the assignment for the benefit of creditors. Accordingly, it is plaintiff's position that the
answers to questions (2) and (3) above should be in
the negative. Those questions will be discused in reverse
order.
P O I N T I.
V I L L A G E R W A S L I M I T E D TO A P U R CHASE MONEY SECURITY
INTEREST
ONLY, A N D ACCORDINGLY, T H E COURT
E R R E D I N D E C L A R I N G A V A L I D SECURITY INTEREST IN INVENTORY OF T H E

8
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COMPANY P U R C H A S E D FROM CREDITORS
OTHER THAN VILLAGER.
The agreed facts show that on July 30, 1970, The
Company Enterprises emerged as survivor of merger
of four constituent corporations: The Village Brownstone, Ltd.; Village Ltd.; Village Brownstone Enterprises; and The Company Enterprises. (R. 59) Village Brownstone, Ltd. gave security agreements to
the Villager, on March 29, 1968 and November 29,
1968, together with financing statements filed with the
Utah Secretary of State on March 19, 1968 and April
14, 1969 respectively. (R. 58) The Village Brownstone Ltd. was doing business in two locations. The
earlier security agreement relates to the retail outlet
at 22 East First South, Salt Lake City, Utah and the
later security agreement relates to the retail outlet at
2354 Washington Boulevard, Ogden, Utah. In both
security agreements the following identical language
is contained in Paragraph 2 thereof (R. 65, 71)
"2. To secure the indebtedness set forth above,
the Undersigned hereby grants to Villager a security interest in and to all of the Undersigned's
peresent and future accounts, contract rights,
general intangibles, instruments, documents,
chattel paper, and a purchase money security interest in the inventory wherever located, and the
proceeds and products thereof (all hereinafter
called the 'Collateral'), together with all other
items of Collateral of the same class or classes
acquired by the Undersigned after the execution
of this agreement and prior to its termination."
(Emphasis supplied)

9
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Although the financing statement filed on April 14,
1969 (R. 70) describes the collateral as * 'inventory
wherever located", the earlier financing statement filed
March 19, 1968 contains the following language, to
wit: "the secured party claims a purchase money security interest in the inventory". (R. 76)
The security agreements in question provide that
they are to be construed under the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Paragraph 7 (h) of each agreement provides as follows:
"(h) This security agreement and the transaction
evidenced hereby shall be construed under the
laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as
the same may from time to time be in effect, including, without limitation, the Uniform Commercial Code." (Emphasis Supplied)
A "purchase money security interest" is a term of
art under the Uniform Commercial Code. The provisions of both the Pennsylvania and the Utah Uniform Commercial Code are identical as they relate to
that term, since both states have followed the 1962
Official Text of the American Law Institute, National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
A purchase money security interest is defined by the
Code at Section 70A-9-107, U.C.A., 1953, as amended,
as follows:
" 'Purchase money security interest.'—A security
interest is a 'purchase money security interest' to
the extent that it is (a) taken or retained by the
seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its
price; or
10
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(b) taken by a person who by making advances
or incurring an obligation gives value to enable
the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if such value is in fact so used." (Emphasis
supplied)
A "purchase money security interest" differs from a
security interest generally because of the preferred
status afforded a purchase money security interest under
the Uniform Commercial Code. For example, Section
70A-9-312 (3) U.C.A. 1953, as amended, affords
priority to a purchase money security interest in inventory collateral, if perfected prior to delivery, although
there may be outstanding at the time of the purchase
a prior security agreement from the purchaser to a
third party granting the latter a security interest in
after-acquired property. Section 70A-9-312 (4) U.C.A.
1953, as amended, affords the same priority to a purchase money security interest in collateral other than
inventory, if perfected at the time of delivery or within
10 days thereafter. Section 70A-9-301 (2) U.C.A.
1953, as amended, affords priority to the holder of a
purchase money security interest over attaching creditors, assignees for the benefit of creditors, receivers
and trustees in Bankruptcy, although these latter persons acquire their respective rights before the holder
of the security interest files a financing statement, provided filing takes place within ten days from the date
the debtor takes possession of the collateral. Although
not applicable here, the Code in Section 70A-9-302
also affords priority over all but bona fide third party
purchasers for value to the holder of a purchase money
11
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security interest in certain farm equipment and consumer goods, without the necessity of filing a financing
statetment at all.
At the time these security agreements were executed, Villager was the franchisor and sole supplier
of inventory to its franchisee, The Village Brownstone,
Ltd. (R. 60, 65). The Villager, being the seller of the
inventory, could protect its interest therein against any
possible prior conflicting security interest if it held a
purchase money security interest, but not otherwise.
Section 70A-9-312 (4) U.C.A. 1953, as amended. If
Villager had not specifically characterized its interest
as "purchase money", it might lose that preferred
status because Paragraph 1 of its security agreements
relating to the indebtedness secured is extremely
broad and includes any and all indebtedness, not
limited to merely the purchase price of the goods sold.
There is respectable authority holding that provisions
in a security agreement which purport to secure advances in addition to the purchase price of the collateral, may disqualify the security interest from being
a "purchase money security interest." See, In Re
Simpson, 4 UCC. Rep. Serv. 243 (W.D. Mich. 1966);
In Re Simpson, 4 UCC. Rep. Serv. 250 (W.D. Mich.
1966). Therefore, by specifically characterizing its
security interest as "purchase money" the Villager perhaps protected its interest against third parties, but in
so doing, it, of necessity limited the scope of its application.
12
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Where a secured party secures only the purchase
price of the collateral, he may hold a purchase money
security interest in collateral without expressly so providing. Conversely, however, the parties here chose to
expressly provide that the only security interest in
inventory granted to the Villager was a "purchase
money" security interest, i.e., a security interest taken
by the Villager as "seller of the collateral to secure
all or part of its price." The reference in the agreement to "all other items of collateral of the same class
or classes acquired . . . after the execution of this
agreement . . . ," admittedly includes inventory. However, the only interest granted in inventory was a "purchase money security interest" which must be taken to
modify both the word "inventory" and the words "all
others items of collateral of the same class". Villager
has never contended that the use of that term was inadvertent. Indeed, Paragraph 2 (quoted above) of
the security agreements in question grant a general
security interest in all collateral therein described other
than inventory, but carefully restricts the security interest in inventory to a "purchase money" interest. Contrast also, the security agreement with the Village,
Brownstone Enterprises in Arizona (R. 61, 82).
Construing the security agreements more strictly
against Villager, being the party that drew the instrument, it is submitted that it granted a security interest
in after-acquired inventory only if it was the seller
thereof. Skousen v. Smith, 493 P.2d 1003, 27 Utah 2d,
1969 (1972), and cases and authorities cited therein.

13
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See also, General Mills v. Cragun, 134
1093-4 (Utah, 1943).

P.2d 1089,

The agreement of the parties is clear and unambiguous. The Villager bargained for and was clearly
granted a security interest in inventory which it was
to sell to its debtor—nothing more. The trial court
erred in expanding the agreement beyond the clear
import of its language and the clear intent of the
parties thereto.
II
THE A F T E R - A C Q U I R E D PROPERTY
CLAUSE
OF
VILLAGERS
SECURITY
AGREEMENTS W I T H T H E CONSTITUENT
CORPORATION (VILLAGE BROWNSTONE,
LTD.) DOES NOT E X T E N D TO PROPERTY
A C Q U I R E D S U B S E Q U E N T TO M E R G E R BY
T H E SURVIVING CORPORATION
(THE
COMPANY).
The two security agreements in question attached
to the Stipulation of Facts (R. 65, 71) purport to encubmer "all other items of collateral of the same class
or classes acquired by the (debtor) after the execution
of (the) agreement and prior to its termination". The
property upon which the defendants seek to impose their
security interest was not property that was acquired
by "Village Brownstone, Ltd.", the debtor under said
security agreements. The property was property that
was acquired by the survivor of merger, The Company
14
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Enterprises. The Association concedes that a merger
or consolidation cannot ordinarily impair the rights
of a lien holder in property existing at the time of the
merger. See, Sec. 16-10-71 (e) U.C.A. 1953, as
amended, and 70A-9-306 (2) U.C.A. 1953, as amended.
However, none of the property liquidated by the Association was in existence at the time of the merger.
The so-called after-acquired clause of the security
agreements, purporting to create an interest in goods
acquired in the future, should have no relation to goods
acquired by a corporation other than the debtor under
the agreement. Otherwise, subsequent innocent but
diligent third party creditors are totally deprived of any
means of notice of prior liens. A potential lender, supplier or other creditor would have no way to determine
the existence of prior outstanding security interests
since the financing statement on file with the Secretary
of State would be in the name of the constituent corporation, not the survivor. Moreover, it is manifestly
inequitable and unfair to other creditors of the debtor
who in reliance upon the appearance of clear, unencumbered assets, extend credit. Indeed, in the instant
case, such creditors may even have been suppliers to
The Company on open account of the very goods in
which the Villager has now been granted a security
interest. What, in effect, the trial court has countenanced is a "secret lien". Cf. In Re Vieihs, 9 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 943 (E.D. Wis. 1971) where the court
stated:

15
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"The purpose of the filing requirements are quite
obvious. The purpose is to give notice to the public, and to future creditors, that the assets of a
debtor are encumbered. The evil to be protected
against is a 'secret lien' against the assets of a
debtor which might cause innocent parties to extend credit to such debtor without knowledge of
the prior lien. To allow one creditor to have a
secret lien would be a fraud on all other creditors.
That is exactly what the bank had in this case—
a secret lien. The notice flied under the name,
Edwin J . Kuhn, was not notice that any lien
existed against the assets of the corporation,
Vieths, Inc. Creditors are not required to look
under the name of the president of a corporation
to determine whether liens exist. The notice must
be filed under the name of the corporation. For
this reason the bank had a secret lien not properly
filed."
The early recognition and application in the United
States of liens on after-acquired property occurred invariably in those cases where a public utility was the
mortgagor. In the early case of Galveston, Houston,
etc. R.R. Co. v, Cowdrey, 78 U.S. 459, 20 L.Ed. 199
(1871), the Supreme Court expressed the reason for
recognition of after-acquired clauses in utility mortgages as follows:
"Had there been but one deed of trust, and had
that been given before a shovel had been put into
the ground towards constructing the railroad, yet
if it assumed to convey and mortgage the railroad,
which the Company was authorized by law to
build, together with its superstructures, appurtenances, fixtures and rolling stock, these several
items of property, as they came into existence,
16
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

would become instantly attached to and covered
by the deed, and would have fed the estoppel
created thereby. No other rational or equitable
rule can be adopted for such cases. To hold otherwise would render it necessary for a railroad
company to borrow money in small parcels as
sections of the road were completed, and trust
deeds could safely be given thereon. The practice of the country and its necessities are in coincidence with the rule" (Emphasis supplied)
See also, Thompson v. White Water Valley Railroad
Company, 132 U.S. 68, 33 L.Ed. 256, 260 (1889).
Indeed, many state legislatures expressly made effective after-acquired clauses in mortgages by this class
of corporation. See, Foley and Pogue, After-Acquired
Property Under Conflicting Corporate Mortgage Indentures, 13 Minn. L. Rev. 81, 88, n. 15 (1929).
However, even in cases involving public utilities,
the courts were reluctant to extend the concept to property acquired by a successor corporation. Indeed, it
appears to be well established law that in those jurisdictions where corporate mortgages on after-acquired
property were recognized, the concept was limited to
property acquired by the mortgagor only and did not
include property acquired by a successor corporation.
Vol. 7, Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations, 1964 Rev.
Vol., Sec. 3110 p. 241 et seq.; Metropolitan Trust Co.
of City of N.Y. v. Chicago & E.I.R. Co., 253 Fed. 868
(7th Cir., 1918); 13 Minn. L. Rev. 81, 85, supra. In
the case of Susquehanna Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v.
United Tel. & Tel. Co., 6 F.2d 179 (3rd Cir. 1925), the
17
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court, in considering this question, there stated the law
as follows:
"While this indubitably is the law of mortgages
and deeds of trust covering after-acquired property, yet it does not go to the extent of holding
that, under the usual after-acquired property provision, the lien of such a mortgage or deed of
trust, on consolidation of a mortgagor corporation with another, spreads to the property contributed by the other constituent, nor does it extend to other property of a new debtor who, as
here, has merely assumed the debt of the mortgage containing the after-acquired property
clause. A mortgage containing such a clause extends only to the property, presently and prospectively held, which it professes to cover, and
only to property then owned and subsequently
acquired by the mortgagor or by another in virtue of the mortgagor's rights."
Admittedly, certain exceptions to the general rule
were declared by some courts. Those exceptions generally related to particular statutory provisions concerning consolidations, mergers, or dissolutions; to
express covenants assuming the mortgage obligation
(not merely the debt alone); to those cases where the
after-acquired property is an accession to the premerger,, pre-consolidation property of the constituent
corporation; or to special cases where the successor
corporation has committed a tort such as interfering
with the affirmative obligation under the mortgage of
the constituent (mortgagor) to acquire additional property. 13 Minn. L. Rev. 88, 91, et. seq., supra.
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An analysis of each of these exceptions and the
cases involving their application, however, disclose that
in almost every instance the mortgagor involved is a
public utility and that its successors by way of consolidation, merger or purchase acquired the property
in order to salvage the existing utility and to preserve
or expand its facilities for the public's use. In the case
of Susquehanna Trust k Safe Deposit Co. v. United
Tel. k Tel Co., supra, the historical plight of many of
these public utility companies is typified in the statement by the court relative to the controversy it was
called upon to decide:
"This case had its rise in the early days of the
telephone, when numberless local corporations,
not realizing the operative and commercial scope
of the invention, built short lines and established
small systems in limited areas. They did this
largely on borrowed money. The outcome of these
adventures, as their history shows, was feeble success or complete failure, resulting ultimately in
receiverships or absorption by larger concerns.
After purchase or merger, properties thus acquired, being already pledged for money borrowed, were usually pledged again by the absorbing corporations, and still again by larger absorbing corporations, until on the original properties
rested many liens of different sizes and priorities.
The instruments creating such liens—whether
mortgages or deeds of trust—frequently contained clauses covering after-acquired property
and on foreclosure there often arose the question
as to which of many instruments was paramount
in respect to property thus acquired and, accordingly, which of many liens thereon was first."
19
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Accordingly, these early rules and exceptions thereto
were developed by the courts to fit the rather unique
plight of the public utility corporation, clothed as it
was with a public interest. In this connection it should
be noted that in those instances where after-acquired
property had no relation to the public use, albeit the
mortgagor was a public utility, such property was held
not to be covered by the after-acquired clause of a
mortgage, even when such property was acquired by
the original mortgagor. See, Note: 33 L.Ed. 256; 13
Minn. L. Rev., 81, 86, n. 22, supra.
I t is submitted that the exceptions noted above
should be restricted to the area of their origins—that
of the public utility corporation and not extended to
cases involving corporations not clothed with a public
interest.
Assuming, for purposes of argument only, that
these exceptions are applicable to mercantile corporations not clothed with a public interest, there is nothing
in the record before the court to justify the application
of any of the exceptions noted. There was no express
covenant of assumption of the mortgage by The Company Enterprises as survivor of merger; the principle
of accession is inapplicable; and no tortious conduct
on the part of the survivor was alleged or shown. The
only relevant statutory provision is contained in Section
16-10-71 (e) U.C.A. 1953, as amended, which provides
as follows:
"(e) Such surviving or new corporation shall
thenceforth be responsible and liable for all the
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liabilities and obligations of each of the corporations so merged or consolidated; and any claim
existing or action or proceeding pending by or
against any of such corporations may be prosecuted as if such merger or consolidation had not
taken place, or such surviving or new corporation
may be substituted in its place. Neither the
right (s) of creditors nor any liens upon the property of any such corporation shall be impaired by
such merger or consolidation." (Emphasis supplied).
As suggested earlier in this brief, the statutory
language noted above must of necessity relate to property of the constituent corporation in eocistence at the
time of merger. This, because no lien can exist until
there is property in existence to which it can attach.
It is only at such time as the property is acquired by
the debtor that the security interest will attach. Section
70A-9-204, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, provides in
pertinent part as follows:
" (1) A security interest cannot attach until there
is an agreement . . . that it attach and value is
given and the debtor has rights in the collateral.
I t attaches as soon as all of the events in the preceding sentence have taken place unless explicit
agreement postpones the time of attaching."
See also, Mcintosh v. U.S., supra.
Accordingly, the language of Section 16-10-71,
supra, on its face, does not extend defendant's afteracquired lien clause to property acquired subsequent
to the merger by the survivor of merger. Indeed, the
statute expressly restricts its provisions to existing
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liens on existing property of a constituent corporation.
H a d the legislature intended to preserve inviolate
after-acquired lien rights upon post-merger property
acquired by the survivor, it would have been a relatively simple matter to do so provide.
The case of Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Chicago
& E.I.R. Co., supra, is instructive in the interpretation
of the statutory provision just quoted. The court in
that case was called upon to construe provisions of an
actual consolidation agreement whereunder, among
other things, the consolidated company agreed that two
earlier mortgages executed by the several constituent
companies, each containing after-acquired property
clauses, "shall have the force and effect of first mortgages executed by this consolidated company." The
Court, at p. 876, in speaking of this provision of the
agreement of consolidation, stated:
"The inclusion of the Metropolitan (mortgage)
in Article V I I had no essential significance beyond the definite recognition by the Consolidated
Company of the mortgage as a lien upon part of
the property so about to pass to the Consolidated
Company and of the purpose to close the mortgage to the further issue of bonds thereunder.
Under the law as it is stated in the above quotation from brief for appellant, the situation of the
Metropolitan mortgage is not materially different from what it would have been had all reference to it been omitted from article V I I . In such
case it would plainly not have been contended
that any lien thereunder was extended to any future acquisitions or ecctensions of the Consolidated Company." (Emphasis supplied)
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Another provision in the consolidated agreement provided for the assumption of the debts and obligations
of the constituent companies by the consolidated company. The court, holding that this provision like the
provision above referred to in Article V I I of the agreement, did not, in and of itself, extend the after-acquired
property clause to property acquired after the consolidation, stated:
"Another instance in the same consolidation
agreement of the distinct expression of that
which in any event the law would impose is found
in article X , whereby the Consolidated Company
assumes all the debts and obligations of the constituent companies. The definite expression of
this obligation does not suggest that one should
seek in it a significance or meaning beyond oi\
different from the general obligation of a consolidated corporation to discharge the debts of tis
constituents." (Emphasis supplied)
By the same reasoning the statutory language
quoted above imposes no greater obligations upon the
surviving corporation than would otherwise be imposed
in the absence of such provisions. Accordingly, there is
no legal basis available to the Villager to claim an
exception to the general rule, even assuming such exception is applicable to a mercantile corporation.

POINT III
T H E SECURITY AGREEMENTS OF T H E
DEFENDANTS ARE INVALID AS AGAINST
T H E P L A I N T I F F ASSIGNEE FOR THE
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B E N E F I T OF CREDITORS, BECAUSE T H E
F I N A N C I N G S T A T E M E N T S ON F I L E A R E
D E F I C I E N T W I T H I N T H E MEANING OF
S E C T I O N 70A-9-402 U.C.A. 1953,AS A M E N D E D .
Section 70A-9-301 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, provides in pertinent part as follows:
" (1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection
(2), an unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of . . . (b) a person who becomes
a lien creditor without knowledge of the security
interest and before it is perfected; . • .
(3) A 'lien creditor' means a creditor who has acquired a lien on the property involved by attachment, levy or the like and includes an assignee for
benefit of creditors from the time of assignment,
and a trustee in bankruptcy from the date of the
filing of the petition or a receiver in equity from
the time of appointment. Unless all the creditors
represented had knowledge of the security interest such a representative of creditors is a lien
creditor without knowledge even though he personally has knowledge of the security interest."
(Emphasis Supplied)
Section 70A-9-302, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, requires that a financing statement must be filed in order
to perfect all security interests, with certain exceptions
not applicable in the instant case. The financing statement on file at the time of the assignment for the benefit
of the creditors was deficient because it did not contain
the name of the debtor-assignor, to wit: The Company
Enterprises. The financing statement on file showed
the debtor to be The Village Brownstone, Ltd. (R-70,
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76) Sub-paragraph 3 of Section 70A-9-402 provides
that the financing statement to be filed must contain
the name of the debtor in order to be sufficient within
the meaning of the statute. The debtor here was the survivor of the merger, The Company—not the Village
Brownstone, Ltd., which ceased to exist as of the date
of the merger.
What has heretofore been said regarding secret
liens under Point I I of this Brief applies to this Point
with equal force. In the case of In Re Viebhs, Inc.,
vu/pra, quoted above, the court invalidated a bank's purported security interest in its debtor's inventory because
the Bank, with full knowledge of the transfer of the
inventory from a sole proprietorship to a corporation,
failed to file a new financing statement in the name of
the new corporation, relying on the original financing
statement filed in the name of the individual only. The
court there acknowledged that had the transfer occurred
without the knowledge or consent of the Bank, its lien
in the original collateral would have continued by reason
of the provisions of Section 9-306 of the Uniform
Commercial Code. The court, having determined the
invalidity of the bank's security interest as against the
Trustee in Bankruptcy, was not required to meet the
additional contention of the Bank that its lien was
valid as to both the original inventory and property
acquired after the date of incorporation. On this point,
the court said:
"Thus if the debtor in this case had formed a corporation and then transferred his assets to the
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corporation without the knowledge or consent of
the bank, the bank's lien on the original collateral
would have continued. Whether it would be good
against after-acquired inventory purchased by
the corporation would be open to serious question. However, in the case before the court, that
question need not be reached." (Emphasis supplied)
The doubt expressed by the court is justified by the
wording of Section 9-306 (2) of the Uniform Commercial Code (70A-9-306 (2) U.C.A. 1953, as amended), which provides as follows:
"(2) Except where this chapter otherwise provides, a security interest continues in collateral
notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof by the debtor unless his action was
authorized by the secured party in the security
agreement or otherwise, and also continues in any
identifiable proceeds including collections received by the debtor."
As with the provisions of Section 16-10-71 (e) U.C.A.
1953, as amended, supra, the quoted provision of the
Utah Uniform Commercial Code must of necessity refer
to an existing security interest since there can be no
security interest, let alone one that "continues in collateral," until collateral to which the interest can attach is in existence. Section 70A-9-204 U.C.A. 1953,
as amended, supra. Admittedly, there is no evidence,
one way or the other, relative to the Villager's actual
knowledge of or consent to the merger. For the reasons
stated, however, it is submitted that its knowledge or
consent is immaterial.
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The fact that The Company continued to do business
at the two locations previously occupied by The Village
Brownstone (R-58) is immaterial. The overwhelming
majority of cases called upon to consider this question
have ruled that filing a financing statement in the trade
name as distinguished from the debtor's actual name
is ineffective, is "seriously misleading" and is a fatal
defect. In the recent case of Northern Commercial
Corp. v. Friedman, 471 F.2d 785 (2nd Cir. 1972), the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held a financing statement to be defective that was filed under the
debtor's duly registered assumed business name of
"Landman Dry Cleaners", rather than the debtor's true
name, Matthew L. Leichter. As the court there stated:
"If the debtor's name is not given, the purpose of
the statutory scheme of requiring security interests to be perfected by filing a financing statement—to give notice to future creditors of the
debtor—would be seriously undermined."
See also, Van Dusen Acceptance Corp. v. Gough, 466
F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1972); In Be Jones, 11 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 249 (E.D. Wis. 1972); In Re Eichler, 9 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 1400 (E.D. Wis. 1971); In Re Merrill, 9
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 757 (D. Neb., 1971); In Re Levens,
7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1076 (E.D. N.Y. 1970); Coca
Cola Bottling Plants, Inc. v. Tabenken, 7 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 565, (D. Maine, 1970); In Re Thomas, 310 F .
Supp. 338, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 800 (N.D. Calif.,
1970); In Re Uptown Variety, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
221 (D. Ore. 1969); In Re The Grape Arbor, Inc., 6
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 632 (E.D. Pa., 1969); John Deere
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Co. of Baltimore, Inc. v. Pahl Const. Co., 300 N.Y.S.
2d 701, 6 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 840 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.,
1969).
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred in determining that The Villager held valid security interests in the inventory of
The Company on hand at 2354 Washington Blvd.,
Ogden, Utah and 22 East First South, Salt Lake City,
Utah at the time of the assignment for the benefit of
creditors, and the case should be reversed and remanded
for the entry of judgment declaring The Villager's
purported lien null and void as to all inventory. This
result is required because The Villager was specifically
and expressly limited by the terms of its security agreements to a purchase money security interest only,
whereas the inventory at the time of the assignment for
the benefit of creditors was inventory not purchased
from The Villager; because the after-acquired property
clause in the constituent corporation's (Village Brownstone, Ltd.) security agreement with The Villager does
not extend to property acquired by the survivor of the
merger, The Company Enterprises; and because, in
any event, there was no proper financing statement on
file with the Secretary of State at the time of the assignment for the benefit of creditors.
Respectfully submitted,
MOYLE & DRAPER
Herschel J . Saperstein
Attorneys for Plaintiffi — C^^eAleuf
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